{"id":2638,"date":"2020-07-26T05:24:53","date_gmt":"2020-07-26T05:24:53","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/?p=2638"},"modified":"2020-07-26T05:53:01","modified_gmt":"2020-07-26T05:53:01","slug":"kargil-war-a-tribute","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/2020\/07\/26\/kargil-war-a-tribute\/","title":{"rendered":"Kargil War: A Tribute"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

By Indrani Pati<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Kargil War Memorial<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Thinkers have multiple views when asked – \u201cWhy Kargil Conflict?\u201d. To begin with,\nthere are a few things – Pakistan\u2019s total defeat by the Indian Armed Forces in the\nprevious three wars of 1948, 1965, and 1971 respectively- in particular, 1971, which\ngave birth to Bangladesh and the world\u2019s largest surrender of Pakistani Armed Forces\nestimated at more than 90,000 armed men; Secondly, Indian Army\u2019s occupation of\nSiachen Glaciers, the highest and coldest battlefield of the world in 1984; thirdly,\nPakistan\u2019s frustration to see containment of J & K militancy; and finally, opposition\nfrom the majority of Pakistan and its Army in particular to the concept and idea of\nconverting LOC into a permanent border between India and Pakistan which had then\ngained momentum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Needless to say, the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan had been and shall\nremain the core issue. With these at the backdrop, it is believed that four Pakistani\nGenerals headed by their then Chief of Army Staff, General Musharraf, conceived a\nplan to occupy 15-20 Kargil heights which later snowballed into 120 peaks aimed at\ninterdicting National Highway-1, the lifeline of Indian troops based at Leh, Siachen,\nand the Kargil sector. It was strongly believed by the opposition that it would be\nimpossible for the Indian Army to recapture Kargil heights on a military level,\nthereby, forcing them to vacate Siachen Glacier occupied in 1984. Further, this was to\nprovide a new dimension to militancy in Kashmir and internationalize the issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During February 1999, the Pakistan Army sent about 5000 heavily armed men\ncomprising of elite Special Service Groups, and five to six battalions of Northern\nLight Infantry, backed by Kashmiri Guerrillas and Afghan missionaries to occupy\nabout 120 mountain peaks in the Kargil Sector on the Indian side of LOC comprising\nof Mushkoh Valley, Batalick, and Kaksar. These posts are generally vacated by the\nIndian Army during winter months and re-occupied again during April or May every\nyear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pakistan\u2019s intrusion in Kargil was first reported by local shepherds on 3rd May, 1999.\nOn this tip-off, an Indian Army patrol led by Capt. Saurabh Kalia was sent during the\nfirst week of May. They were ambushed and five Indian soldiers were captured and\ntortured to death violating all UN conventions on war. Around 10th May, massive\ninfiltration was noticed in Dras, Kaksar, and Mushkoh sector, resulting in ingress\nbetween 150-200 Square km of area. Initially, it was thought to be a handful of\nJihadis who could have been evicted within a few days.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Air Force Mirage 2000<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

However, on realizing the enormity of treachery, the Indian Government responded\nwith \u201cOperation Vijay\u201d Mobilizing 200,000 troops; but due to the nature of the\nterrain, the attacks uphill could be launched at the battalion and company level only.\nEven though such a large force was mobilized, only close to 30,000 Indian soldiers\nwere actively involved in the conflict. The Indian Air Force launched an operation on\n26th May with restrictions of not crossing LOC to avoid escalation. This was for the\nfirst time globally, wherein, an air-war was fought at such high altitudes, with targets\nbetween 6000 to 18,000 feet above mean sea level. With no oppositions from\nPakistan Air force, IAF had enough time to select and interdict well-fortified enemy\nposts mostly with Mirage-2000 fleets. The Indian Navy was employed to block all\ntrade routes in the Arabian Sea to cut-off Karachi Port.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Indian Army had the most unthinkable and toughest tasks ahead i.e attacking the\nmountain peaks uphill with an average height of 17,000 to 18,000 feet where the\nenemy was sitting well entrenched and equipped. Many posts were heavily mined.\nHere, the Indian Army had a double dilemma – attacking uphill by day was suicide\nand attacking by night had the risk of freezing on account of wind chill factor, with\ntemperatures dropping to -13 O C to -15 O C. Above all, Pakistani forces had clear line\nof sight of NH-1 and could bring down heavy indirect artillery fire, thereby making\nany move of the Indian troops impossible. India suffered heavily on this account.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Initial Indian attacks were aimed at controlling hills overlooking NH-1, like-Tiger\nHill, Tololing Complex in Dras followed by Batalik-Turtok sub-sector. Aim was\nunambiguous, uncompromising, and at any cost, against all odds to recapture our own\nterritory and push-back the enemy. Fear, life, and death had no place in the mind of\nan Indian soldier at this juncture. Only restoration of lost glory by any means, at any\ncost. Airstrike was launched on 26th May and suffered heavy setbacks. On 6th June,\nthe Indian Army launched major offensive in Kargil moving up inch-\nby-inch, boulder to boulder, re-capturing two key positions in Batalik sector. The first\nsuccess was on 9th Jun; Tololing was secured on 13th June which shifted the war in\nIndia\u2019s favour and by 1st July, India started launching three pronged attacks. Tiger\nhill was recaptured after 11 hours of battle on 4th July, followed by control of Dras on\n05th July, and Jubar Heights in Batalick on 7th July. At this stage, Pakistan came\nunder panic as its position weakened due to mounting casualities, disrupted supply\nline, its inability to use air-power and a weak, diplomatic platform. PM Nawaz Sharif\nannounced Pakistan Army\u2019s withdrawal from Kargil after a meeting with President\nClinton.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By this time 75 to 80% of the intruded areas and nearly all high grounds were\nre-captured. Indian Army had to assault a number of unknown and unnamed peaks\nwhich witnessed fierce hand to hand combat. Even after the withdrawal was\n\nannounced, the united Jihad Council (an umbrella for extremist group) refused to\nclimb down, and instead, decided to fight till the very end. Hence, the Indian Army\ncontinued its attack both by day and night till the last week of July, 1999 and re-\ncaptured the whole area on 26th July. On this day, the Indian Army announced\ncomplete eviction of Pakistani intruders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The losses suffered by the Pakistan army have been difficult to determine because of\nmultiple versions. Their official figure stands at 453 killed and about 1000 wounded.\nNawaz Sharif stated over 4000 fatalities. Many Pakistani villages got destroyed and\ndisplaced because of arty shelling. The Pakistan Government though promised, never\ngave compensation or assistance to the poor villagers to return to a normal life.\nPakistan\u2019s already weak economy, further deteriorated substantially.\nIndia\u2019s casualties were 527 dead and 1363 wounded. One Indian pilot was officially\ncaptured during the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Indian soldiers in Batalik during the Kargil War<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

In India, there was a surge in patriotism with many celebrations expressing their\nsupport for the Kargil cause. Indian Government severed ties with Pakistan and\nfocused on defence preparedness. Media criticized the Government for military\nprocurement irregularities, RAW for intelligence failure, a sense of complacency\ntowards conventional war preparedness under the plea of nuclearism, and so on. On\nthe diplomatic front, Indo-US relations not only improved but viewed a clear shift\nagainst Pakistan. The world appreciated India for its matured restrain of not crossing\nthe LOC and restricting the geographical limit of the conflict but at a huge cost of\nhuman lives. At the same time it is argued that many lives lost due to frontal attack\ncould have been saved if the Indian Army was allowed to cross LOC to block the\nsupply line and siege the area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kargil conflict became the first live war in South Asia with extensive war footage\ntelecast on TV and websites. Many Indian channels showed images from the battle\nzone in a style reminiscent of CNN\u2019s coverage of the Gulf war. The print media in\nIndia and abroad was largely sympathetic to the Indian cause and blamed Pakistan for\nthe conflict. The International community was concerned about the nuclear dimension\nif the conflict intensified. To that extent, Nawaz Sharif in his biography has claimed\nthat General Parvez Musharraf had actually moved forward nuclear warheads without\ninforming him – such was the level of frustration in Pakistan military hierarchy. In\nfact, during 2012, retired Maj Gen Abdul Majeed Malik, one of Musharraf\u2019s senior\nofficers, stated that, \u201cKargil was a total disaster\u201d. Pakistan was in no position to fight\nIndia in that area. Hence, on the insistence of Gen Musharraf, PM Sharif got around\nPresident Clinton and got Pakistan out of the difficult situation. Benazir Bhutto, then\nopposition leader and former PM called Kargil War, \u201cPakistan\u2019s greatest blunder.\u201d\nEven today, as per intelligence reports, the Kargil blunder is discussed with disdain in\nPakistani barracks.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u201cEither I Come Back After Hoisting the Tricolor, Or I will be back wrapped in it, but I will be back for sure\u201d – Captain Vikram Batra, PVC – such were the
\nsentiments of the people who were a part of the Kargil War.
\nToday is the 26 th of July, and the nation yet again celebrates Kargil Vijay Diwas to commemorate and honour our heroes.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":19,"featured_media":2639,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"quote","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,9],"tags":[1835,1832,683,1847,1831,1852,1859,1829,1839,1840,1862,1850,1845,1863,157,1856,1855,1860,1844,1846,1827,1828,1841,1851,1838,1830,1836,1843,1864,1842,1857,1837,437,781,1849,1833,1848,1834,1861,1858,1853,116,1854],"class_list":["post-2638","post","type-post","status-publish","format-quote","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-history","category-polity","tag-armed-forces","tag-army","tag-bangladesh","tag-battalion","tag-battle","tag-captain","tag-company","tag-conflict","tag-death","tag-dispute","tag-fortification","tag-general","tag-guerrillas","tag-iaf","tag-india","tag-infiltration","tag-ingress","tag-interdict","tag-internationalize","tag-jihad","tag-kargil","tag-kashmir-issue","tag-leh","tag-lieutenant","tag-life","tag-loc","tag-loss","tag-militancy","tag-mirage-2000","tag-missionaries","tag-mobilization","tag-momentum","tag-opposition","tag-pakistan","tag-regiment","tag-siachen","tag-special-forces","tag-surrender","tag-target","tag-terrain","tag-un-convention","tag-war","tag-warfare","post_format-post-format-quote"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2638","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/19"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2638"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2638\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2658,"href":"https:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2638\/revisions\/2658"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2639"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2638"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2638"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.itisaras.org\/projectdhaara\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2638"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}